



antisemitismus
meldestelle

Antisemitic cases in Austria 2025

ISRAELITISCHE KULTUSGEMEINDE WIEN



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ANTISEMITISMUS MELDEN UND BEKÄMPFEN



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1. Forewords

Four antisemitic incidents per day, 30 per week: We are fighting back. And you?



1,532 antisemitic incidents were reported to the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism of the IKG Vienna in 2025 – more than ever before. The antisemitic tsunami that followed October 7, 2023 has turned into a sustained flood that Jews in Austria have now been living with for more than two years. What is troubling is what the numbers do not show: some have grown used to the unbearable, others withdraw, conceal their Jewishness, avoid Jewish places. We cannot and must not get used to this – neither within the Jewish community nor in society as a whole. The National Strategy Against Antisemitism 2.0, presented in November 2025, is an important step and shows that the political will is there. What it takes is a clear stance – in politics, in the judiciary, in newsrooms, in classrooms, in the workplace and online. As a Jewish community, we do not and will not let ourselves be intimidated. But we depend on civil society if we want to secure Jewish life in the long term as a self-evident part of Austria.

Oskar Deutsch, President of the Jewish Community Vienna

It is not the numbers but the people affected who come first



Since October 7, 2023, the team of the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism has been working without pause. What began as a state of emergency has become everyday reality – and therein lies part of the problem. The sheer number of incidents has repeatedly pushed the team to the limits of its capacity. But: care, accompaniment, counselling and referral are the principal task of the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism – and the team around Johannan Edelman performs this task with great empathy and professionalism. What is new and troubling in 2025 is that antisemitism no longer appears only in clearly delineable incidents. We are dealing with a hostile atmosphere that Jews can feel in their everyday lives. For many of those affected, this constant strain leads to a numbing – not out of indifference, but as a protective response. The result: willingness to report falls, and the number of unreported cases rises. The 1,532 verified incidents are the tip of the iceberg. Our work remains dependent on those affected, as well as witnesses, coming forward.

Benjamin Nägele, Secretary General of the Jewish Community Vienna

What the numbers show, and what they don't



At first glance, the report suggests continuity: reported antisemitic incidents rose by less than one percent compared with 2024. In fact, their number more than doubled between 2022 and 2024, and in 2025 it remains at that record level. That is not a sign of stability, but the opposite. The total number of reports lies well above the 1,532 cases ultimately documented. Only those that are unambiguously antisemitic under the IHRA working definition are included; reports that do not pass this review do not enter the figures. Even so, the recorded cases stand at the highest level ever measured – and this at a time of simultaneously falling willingness to report. This discrepancy points to a development beyond the statistics: the condensation of underlying antisemitic sentiment into an atmosphere that Jews perceive on a permanent basis.

Johannan Edelman, Head of the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism


2. Summary

In the calendar year 2025, the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism (Antisemitismus-Meldestelle) of the Jewish Community of Vienna (IKG) recorded a total of 1,532 antisemitic incidents. This corresponds to a non-significant increase of less than one percent and represents the highest figure ever recorded.

The genocidal large-scale attack by Palestinian terrorist organisations on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the war it triggered continued to have a massive influence on developments in Austria in 2025. Even though the direct hostilities have been put on ice for the time being by a ceasefire in place since October of last year, this conflict and the complex situation that goes with it remained a defining factor in Austria as well through to the end of the reporting period, particularly in Jewish everyday life.

On average over the year there were 4.2 incidents per day, which corresponds to a minimal increase compared with 2024 (4.13 incidents per day); measured against the period from October 7, 2023 to the end of that year (8.13 incidents per day), however, this represents a halving. For comparison: from 1 January to 6 October 2023 the average number of reported antisemitic incidents stood at 1.55 per day.

Antisemitic incidents (in total)



Of the 1.532 incidents, there were:

19 physical assaults (2024: 24)

27 threats (2024: 38)


205 damage and desecration (2024: 216)

439 mass mailings (2024: 616)

842 abusive behaviour (2024: 626)

This report does not provide a complete overview of antisemitism in Austria. Only antisemitic incidents that were reported and that, upon review by the experts of the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism in accordance with the IHRA definition (see [Methodology](#)), were unambiguously verified as antisemitic are recorded. A considerable number of unreported cases must be assumed, which – owing to the noticeable decline in willingness to report, observable internationally as well – must this time be put higher than in the years up to 2024.


2025: Antisemitic incidents (in total)



After 74 documented antisemitic incidents in December 2024, this threshold was not undercut at any point throughout 2025. The annual peak was reached in May with 220 – the third-highest monthly figure since the systematic documentation of antisemitic incidents in Austria began.

May was marked by a veritable flood of emails to the IKG and Jewish individuals: of a three-digit number of incoming emails, 78 were verified as antisemitic and some were communicated to the relevant authorities on account of their extremist content. 78 is by far the

Changes in the number of reported incidents since 2010



Trend in the number of reports (*no report for 2018)

highest historical figure in this subcategory. With 285 antisemitic emails over the year as a whole, there was a 30 percent increase compared to 2024 (220).

The share of social media in the total is rising continuously and now stands at 50.5 percent (after 48.7 percent in 2024). It should be borne in mind that the recording methodology depicts online incidents conservatively: where several antisemitic comments occur in a thread or a forum, they are nonetheless always counted as a single incident. The actual quantity of antisemitic content on social media therefore lies well above the reported incident figures.

3. Analysis & Commentary

While the number of reports [in the first half of 2025](#) was slightly declining, the first six weeks of the second half of the year were already marked by an unusually high number of incidents. The number of reported and verified antisemitic incidents even rose in August to the second-highest figure of the year (152 incidents). This quantitative acceleration was particularly apparent in the two most physically immediate incident types: assaults and threats. In the first six weeks of the second half of the year, as many assaults were recorded as from January to June. In total, from July to December 2025 as many physical assaults (14) were reported in a single half-year as previously only in the first six months of 2024 (19).

The number of threats followed an analogous pattern: it shot up from eight in the first half of the year to 19 in the second. A higher half-year figure was last recorded only in the first six months of 2024, when 22 threats were registered.

3. 1. Habituation and Desensitisation Effect

As already discussed in last year's report, many Jews have developed a habituation and often also desensitisation effect towards antisemitism in the face of what was, at that point, approximately two years of the overwhelming feeling of sustained pressure or even a state of siege. This was first noticed through empirical observations in everyday conversations. After the Reporting Centre team began to observe similar patterns in other countries, and the accumulation of anecdotes appeared to point to a structural problem, [studies](#), [surveys](#) and [analytical examinations](#) emerged that addressed the psychological state of Jewish communities after October 7.

3. 2. Between Everyday Experience and Statistics

Antisemitism today no longer manifests solely in individual, clearly identifiable incidents. It has condensed into an atmosphere that those affected feel on a lasting basis, without it necessarily falling under the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism, or even manifesting in a concrete incident. The term “**ambient antisemitism**” has since become established for this; coined by the British sociologist [Jonathan Boyd](#), it rapidly found its way into European discourse. [Katharina von Schnurbein](#), EU Coordinator on Combating Antisemitism, used it in September 2025 in her speech in the Austrian Parliament. A year earlier, [Yonathan Arfi](#), President of the umbrella organisation of Jewish organisations in France, spoke there of “atmospheric antisemitism.”

This phenomenon is defined not by individual events but by its omnipresence. In public space it shows itself in graffiti, stickers or leaflets glorifying violence and terror in the streetscape,

in regular anti-Israel demonstrations with at times openly antisemitic slogans, in reporting on the conflict that is increasingly perceived as one-sided, and in a poisoned climate on social media. In people's personal surroundings, it takes the form of casual relativisations in everyday working or university life, a lack of empathy towards the victims of October 7, and the fading of solidarity among acquaintances.

The effect of this constant pressure is apparent on several levels, all of which reduce the statistical visibility of antisemitism.

On the one hand, the omnipresent pressure leads to a **habituation effect**: what was initially perceived as shocking gradually shifts into the realm of the supposedly normal. The threshold of what those affected regard as worth reporting rises. This exacerbates an already existing structural problem: general research on hate crime already shows that the majority of incidents are not reported to any body – among other reasons because those affected regard them as “too minor,” or because they “happen all the time,” as the [EU Agency for Fundamental Rights](#) has noted.

A striking example from 2025: a religious Jew reported that an Uber driver cancelled a ride that had already been confirmed and drove off once he recognised his passenger's religious affiliation from his clothing. This happened to him incessantly, he said; only this time it had upset him particularly, because it made him late for an important appointment. Asked by a member of the Reporting Centre's staff to report such incidents in future, so as at least to be able to form a better picture of the problem, he replied sarcastically: he was by no means the only one. It happened to him and to other acquaintances recognisable as Jewish by their clothing all the time, but people had long since got used to it – “then I just order the next one.”

On the other hand, European Jews are developing systematic **avoidance strategies**: they conceal their affiliation, change their names with ride-hailing and food-delivery services, avoid Jewish events, and censor themselves in conversations and on social media. Those who do not make themselves recognisable as Jewish are less often subjected to direct hostility. This retreat goes hand in hand with a decline in antisemitic hostility and in the corresponding reports.

A third dimension comes on top of this: **the withdrawal from social relationships and spaces**. Those affected report growing distance from their non-Jewish surroundings, the breaking-off of friendships, and withdrawal into their own community. This social isolation goes beyond the question of outward recognisability: it affects the quality of participation in society as a whole and additionally removes antisemitic experiences from the perception of the majority society.

A [study in “Social Forces”](#) confirms that the perception of this omnipresent threat is one of the strongest factors behind European Jews' fear of themselves becoming victims of attacks – irrespective of whether they have already been directly affected.

Habituation, avoidance and social withdrawal are not phenomena independent of one another; they reinforce each other: habituation raises the reporting threshold, avoidance reduces the exposure and thus the measurable incidents, and isolation removes what has been experienced from the broader societal field of view. Together they reduce the volume of reports and thereby increase the recording gap in the field of antisemitism. The documented cases represent only the tip of a far larger number of unreported ones. This is precisely where the significance of a low-threshold, trust-based reporting structure anchored in the Jewish


community lies: it lowers the inhibition threshold created by the processes described above and makes visible antisemitic incidents that would otherwise appear in no statistics at all.

Not only that: following the occurrences relating to Uber mentioned above, as well as an antisemitic assault by an Uber driver on learning that his passengers were Jewish (see Chapter “Assaults”), a fruitful exchange came about between the IKG Vienna and the Reporting Centre on the one hand and the very proactive management of Uber Austria on the other. In the course of it, the individual incidents were analysed, existing complaint protocols evaluated, and concrete approaches and solutions developed. The contractual relationship with the driver was also terminated.

3. 3. Official and Other Data

These findings do not stand in contradiction to official data but rather confirm them. The [Hate Crime Situation Report of the Ministry of the Interior \(BMI\)](#) records a total of 347 police-registered antisemitic bias motives for 2024 – the highest level since recording began in 2020 and an increase of 32 percent on the previous year (263). Antisemitism was thus by far the most frequent bias motive in the “Religion” category in 2024, which, with fewer than 15,000 Jewish people in Austria, represents an appalling disproportionality.

Number of police-recorded bias motives in the category “Religion”



Among the right-extremist offences recorded by the BMI, an analogous trend is apparent: anti-semitic acts rose from 33 (2022) to 93 (2025) – almost a threefold increase within three years. Here too, the relation to the size of the Jewish community makes clear that Jews in Austria, as

a numerically small minority, are affected by bias-motivated crime to an entirely disproportionate degree.

Year	Total	Far-right	Racist	Antisemitic	Anti-Muslim	Other
2021	1.053	819	66	52	9	107
2022	928	791	51	33	3	50
2023	1.208	1.080	66	43	7	12
2024	1.486	1.296	97	59	9	25
2025	1.986	1.701	127	93	16	49

Source: Parliamentary inquiry responses (Federal Ministry of the Interior)

Further reports and studies worth reading, which illuminate at least partial aspects of anti-semitism, are the [Right-Wing Extremism Report of the DÖW](#), the [Constitutional Protection Report of the DSN](#), the [FRA surveys on the discrimination experiences of Jewish people in the EU](#), and the [Eurobarometer on perceptions of antisemitism](#).

The [IFES Antisemitism Studies](#) commissioned by the Parliamentary Directorate deserve particular mention, as they are the only regularly conducted survey that captures antisemitic attitudes in the overall Austrian population and thus provide a central data foundation for assessing the societal climate.

3. 4. War Against Israel and Antisemitism

It came as little surprise that at the end of the reporting period – that is, more than two years after October 7, 2023 – the war against Israel was the defining element for Jewish life world-wide. Several state and non-state actors are involved in this war: Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and other Palestinian terrorist organisations, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iran.

While the attention of the world public continuously turns to new crisis hotspots, the conflict remains omnipresent for Jews in the diaspora. The situation has changed from an acute emergency into a chronic state of heightened security.

One far-reaching phenomenon of the past two and a half years is the way the conflict has burst its boundaries. The battle is being waged not only militarily in the Middle East, but ideologically on the streets of Western capitals, in lecture halls, in schoolyards, on social media, in international institutions and not least in human rights organisations, which increasingly appear as partisan actors. In this, Jews are targeted with hostility as tangible stand-ins for Israel, while Israel itself is systematically demonised and delegitimised.

Since 2022, Israel-related antisemitism has been the predominant manifestation of antisemitic incidents: in 2025, 77.4% of all documented cases fell into this category. In 2020

the figure was still 21.4%, and from January to September 2023 only 23.8% (see Chapter [“Manifestations of Antisemitism”](#)).

As in the reports of previous years, it is explicitly pointed out at this juncture too that criticism of the State of Israel, or even insults directed at Israel – however deeply spiteful or mendacious – are by no means assessed as antisemitic per se. The [recognised working definition of antisemitism](#) used by the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism (see Chapter [“Methodology”](#)) explicitly excludes this. The illustrative examples state verbatim: “Criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.”

3. 4. 1. The Campaign Against the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism

Nevertheless, this definition is frequently reproduced by numerous national and international actors in truncated form or in a way that distorts its meaning – for instance through the claim that it declares any criticism of Israel to be antisemitic across the board. This claim can be refuted on the basis of the actual wording (see Chapter [“Methodology”](#)). The working basis consists of a definition text and eleven application examples, seven of which relate to the State of Israel. This emphasis reflects the intensity of the public debate: the boundary between legitimate criticism of Israeli policy and antisemitic attributions is addressed particularly controversially in public discourse and therefore requires the most differentiated engagement – precisely also in order to ensure that criticism is not classified as antisemitic in an undifferentiated way.

Crucially, the introductory sentence to the examples expressly states that certain behaviours “could, taking into account the overall context,” be classified as antisemitic – not necessarily and not automatically. The definition thus requires a context-dependent case-by-case examination.

In criticism of the definition, however, all of this frequently goes unmentioned. A differentiated working basis is thereby reinterpreted as an instrument of censorship and repression. In parallel, alternative definitions are invoked that in effect blank out Israel-related antisemitism.

The debate around the IHRA Working Definition goes beyond a purely academic definitional dispute. Whoever delegitimises the internationally recognised instrument for identifying antisemitism makes it harder to name antisemitism as such, especially where it hides behind political criticism.

3. 4. 2. Israel-Related Antisemitism in Documentation Practice

A look at the actual work of the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism shows how far this debate misses reality. By far the greatest part of reported and verified incidents does not move in a grey area between legitimate criticism and antisemitism; rather, it could hardly be more unambiguous. Even sharp condemnations, insults or defamations of Israel or of Israeli policy are not antisemitism taken on their own, and as such would find no way into the statistics.

Beyond that, an incident can have several manifestation types. In more than three quarters of cases, at least one further manifestation is added, most frequently antisemitic othering (43.2%) and Shoah relativisation or denial (42.1%). The claim that the concept of Israel-related antisemitism merely serves to brand unwelcome positions wholesale as antisemitic is empirically untenable.

In 2025, antisemitism in Austria came from all ideological spectrums. The IHRA Working Definition is designed to recognise it in all its manifestations. Whoever reduces the definition to its Israel-related examples and ignores the rest is engaging in a selective reading.

In addition, reference should be made to the [“Handbook for the Practical Use of the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism”](#) from 2021, which was commissioned by the European Commission and produced by our partners at the German Bundesverband RIAS.

3. 4. 3. Shoah Distortion and Antisemitic Othering

The causes and forms of manifestation analysed in the [previous year’s report](#) (cf. the section “The Shoah and Its Misuse,” p. 8) do retain their validity; the dynamic in 2025, however, was additionally accelerated by three central developments.

Discursive De-bordering and Normalisation

The continual shifting of the boundaries of what can be said in public space has led to a creeping normalisation of Shoah comparisons and historical distortions and has increasingly given historical-revisionist narratives entry into mainstream civil-society discourse.

This normalisation is evident not least in the handling of the anti-Israel scene itself: a marked discrepancy continues to be observable between its actual discourse and the meta-discourse about it. While it not only does not conceal its positions in speeches, actions and social media content but transports them offensively, it is frequently played down or insufficiently contextualised in public discourse. The chapter “Categorisation of Antisemitic Incidents and Examples” contains a small selection of statements and social media posts that have less to do with “human rights” or “solidarity with Palestine” than with the explicit delegitimisation and demonisation of Israel and the call for its non-negotiable elimination.

As if it were the most natural thing in the world, a central figure of the scene dances openly and smiling to “Death, death to the IDF!”¹ As organiser of the so-called “Jewish anti-Zionist congress” in Vienna in June, she declared the abolition of Zionism and the “liberation of Palestine” to be the goal of the event. At the same time, actors like her are regularly offered a media stage from which they can direct a calibrated message at a broad audience – far removed from the radicalism they openly display within the scene.

This radicalism does not remain confined to discourse. It manifests itself in attention-grabbing disruptive actions, such as the [storming of studios of the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation \(ORF\)](#) or the disruption of the opening ceremony of the Salzburg Festival. Beyond that, an [“anti-Zionist arson attack”](#) occurred in the middle of Vienna, preceded by a disturbing campaign by self-described “left-wing” activists that was rife not only with antisemitism but also with hatred of Western society, capitalism, and ultimately the very liberal-democratic constitutional order on whose protections these same activists simultaneously rely.

The extremist character of some parts of the milieu can be recognised through the example of the Viennese association *Dar al Janub*, which, according to an analysis by the Documentation Centre on Political Islam, links Islamist and far-left positions and maintained contacts with Hamas functionaries.² It became the subject of [criminal investigations in 2025](#) for membership

1 A call for violence against Israeli soldiers that became popular at the 2025 Glastonbury Festival and which, according to [CST](#), was used as an antisemitic slogan in dozens of cases and triggered the highest single-day rise in anti-Jewish incidents in the UK.

2 Documentation Centre on Political Islam, Political Islam from the Left? The Association Dar al Janub as a Link Between Islamism and the Radical Left (DPI Focus), December 2023. https://www.dokumentationsstelle.at/fileadmin/dpi/publikationen/DPI_Focus_Dar-al-Janub.pdf

in or support of a terrorist organisation (§ 278b of the Criminal Code). Between February and September 2025, the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counter-Extremism conducted raids at five locations, including the association's premises in Vienna-Ottakring and the private residences of board members. The association remains a central component of anti-Israel activism in Austria to this day.

Instrumentalisation

The much-criticised conduct of the war by the State of Israel functions for the anti-Israel scene as a powerful catalyst. It supplies these actors with the supposed argumentative legitimisation to escalate Shoah distortions further, quantitatively and qualitatively. In this, the historical singularity of the Shoah is not only deliberately reinterpreted as a political weapon against the Jewish state; through Shoah inversion, a deeply perfidious reversal of perpetrator and victim is also pursued, in that the State of Israel is equated with the Nazi regime and Palestinians with Jews.

Deficits in Judicial Sanctioning

Existing laws – above all the [Prohibition Act amended in 2024](#), which now makes any, and not merely “gross,” trivialisation of the Shoah a criminal offence – display obvious enforcement deficits in practice. This clear discrepancy between legal aspiration and implementation means that many offences de facto go unpunished. The legislative tightening on paper alone has so far been unable to curb these malicious strategies of historical falsification effectively, which increasingly conveys to actors of all ideological backgrounds a fatal sense of impunity.

Against 499 cases of Shoah relativisation/denial with a connection to Israel in 2025, and 377 in 2024, stands a single publicly documented conviction under the Prohibition Act: a woman who in [October 2023](#) endorsed Hamas's terror and denied the National Socialist genocide was sentenced in July 2024, for re-engagement in National Socialist activity (Wiederbetätigung), to one year's imprisonment suspended on probation.

Such comparisons establish at the very least the initial suspicion of trivialisation under [§ 3h of the Prohibition Act](#). It is not for nothing that the so-called “Palestine Solidarity Austria” is a vehement [opponent of the Prohibition Act](#), locating its amendment in the “context of unconditional loyalty to Zionist settler colonialism.”

It should be noted that there is a possibility that [Art. III para. 1 no. 4 of the Introductory Act to the Administrative Procedure Acts \(EGVG\)](#) may have been applied, which sanctions other dissemination of National Socialist ideology as an administrative offence and was adjusted in the framework of the amendment to the Prohibition Act. On this, however, there are naturally no data.

That the Prohibition Act is generally not being effectively enforced has been repeatedly addressed in recent times. In 2024 the number of convictions under the Prohibition Act fell from 211 to 177 compared with the previous year, while that of discontinued proceedings rose from 1,529 to 2,022. In [October 2025](#), the Mauthausen Committee Austria (MKÖ) and the Upper Austrian Network Against Racism and Right-Wing Extremism addressed an open letter, signed by 79 public figures – among them Elfriede Jelinek, Cornelius Obonya and Karl Öllinger ([Stoppt die Rechten](#)) – to Interior Minister Karner and Justice Minister Sporrer. It demands an end to the mass discontinuation of Prohibition Act proceedings on often questionable grounds, and the creation, through broadly based further-training measures, of an awareness within the judiciary of the significance of the Prohibition Act.

Particularly problematic is the diversion option for adults introduced with the 2024 amendment. Already in the first year of the reformed Prohibition Act there were, at 144, almost as many diversions for adults as there were convictions (177) – there can be no talk of the “[few and carefully reviewed cases](#)” the Ministry of Justice had announced when the amendment was introduced.

3. 5. National Strategy Against Antisemitism 2.0

With the presentation of the [National Strategy Against Antisemitism 2.0](#) in November 2025, the Federal Government responded to the changed threat landscape. The updated strategy expands the framework from six to eight fields of action and from 41 to 49 measures, including for the first time self-contained focal points on digital spaces and media, on the international dimension, and on society, democracy and sport. Among the flagship measures are the deployment of AI-supported detection systems against antisemitic hate speech, the mandatory inclusion of antisemitism prevention in the integration programme, and the examination of the establishment of an Austrian Holocaust museum. The [unanimous acknowledgement](#) by the Constitutional Committee on 12 March 2026 underscores the broad parliamentary backing.

The Federal Chancellery names the Reporting Centre as the central point of contact for antisemitic incidents in Austria. A newly envisaged documentation office within the Federal Chancellery is expressly conceived as a complement to the Reporting Centre of the IKG Vienna. Beyond that, the IKG participates in central bodies and projects of the National Strategy, from the Task Force on Online Antisemitism to the National Forum Against Antisemitism. The NAS 2.0 thereby anchors institutionally what has long been reality in practice: that the systematic recording of antisemitic incidents by a reporting structure anchored in the Jewish community constitutes an indispensable element of state efforts to combat antisemitism.

4. Categorisation of Antisemitic Incidents and Examples

A key component of collecting, analysing, and disseminating data related to antisemitism is the categorisation of antisemitic incidents. For two decades, various EU institutions have identified the lack of international comparability in this area as a significant problem in combating antisemitism and have therefore sought to promote the standardisation of approaches.

To this end, EU-level [guidelines for the categorisation of antisemitic](#) incidents have been published³, which were themselves significantly influenced by the [British Community Security Trust \(CST\)](#), which is particularly experienced in this regard.

Over recent years, this categorical framework has been largely adopted across Europe by several organisations documenting antisemitism:

- The Reporting Centre for Antisemitism of the IKG Vienna cooperates here with RIAS in Germany and has now been using this methodology in its work for seven years.
- The [European Network on Monitoring Antisemitism \(ENMA\)](#) is continuing the harmonisation efforts with regard to internationally comparable data and thus represents a further step in the international fight against antisemitism.

The following section explains these categories and illustrates them with a number of examples from the past year. Further details on the methodology of the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism's work and on the international context are addressed in the section [Methodology](#).

4.1. Assaults

This category includes any form of physical attack on people and buildings, with or without weapons. Even an unsuccessful attempt at an attack (whether the victim fought back or was able to flee) is included in this category. The same applies to throwing objects at people, even if they miss their target.

April 9: The owner of a shop that is perceivable as Jewish on account of its name is talking on the phone in Hebrew in the sales area when an older man enters the shop. He too is on a call and says loudly that he is now in the "shitty Jew shop." When the shop owner offers the man his assistance, the latter reacts aggressively and insults him as "shitty Jew," among other things, then threatens him and his family with death, announces that he intends to set the shop on fire, describes himself as "Persian-Iranian terrorist" and strikes out without warning, injuring the shop owner. When the latter attempts to push the attacker out of the shop, there is another scuffle and repeated threats. The police are notified. A staff member of the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism files a report with the police together with the shop owner.

July 1: A woman is riding the subway. She is wearing a Star of David necklace and her tattoo in Hebrew characters is plainly visible. She notices a group of three men looking in her direction. She avoids eye contact. As she is about to exit, one of the men barges into her with full force, so that she loses an earphone. As the doors close, he looks at her and insults her as a "Jew slut."

August 7: Several members of a Jewish family travel to Vienna for a birthday celebration. The family members, who come from several countries, order a vehicle from the ride-hailing service Uber. During the journey the driver enquires about the passengers' origins. After England, Sweden and

³ https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/184-AS-Main-report.pdf

Israel are mentioned, the driver begins to shout angrily and insults them as “child murderers.” The passengers – among them small children – explain that they have done nothing to anyone. This does not stop the driver from continuing to shout at them and pressing them to leave the vehicle. The children are frightened and begin to cry. The family gets out. The driver also gets out and suddenly attacks the father physically. He punches and kicks him and again insults him as a “child murderer.” Together with a staff member of the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism, a report is filed with the police.

November: On 28 November 2025, unknown perpetrators set a fire in front of an innovation centre in Vienna that has a Jewish managing director. A suitcase is set alight in front of the entrance to the building, which also houses a hotel. The perpetrators additionally spray “Free Palestine” on a nearby billboard and throw paint-filled eggs at the façade. In a video published on Instagram, the anonymous group “Students of the Palestinian Cause in Austria,” which describes itself as “left-wing,” claims responsibility for the act and describes the attack as an [“anti-Zionist arson attack”](#). The police extinguish the fire and investigate, especially in view of the fact that there had already been threats weeks earlier, as well as implicit calls for violence not only against the company but also against named employees.

4. 2. Threats

A threat is defined as: a concretely formulated threat of physical violence against individuals or institutions that are Jewish or perceived to be Jewish; the threat is specific and can be either written or verbal. Bomb threats and fake bombs targeting Jewish institutions are also categorised as threats.

April 24: A man is sitting in a bar in Vienna and gets into conversation with two women. After they exchange business cards – on which his contact details are also printed in Hebrew script – the two become increasingly aggressive. They hurl statements at him such as “Israel has no right to exist. Palestine will be free” and “Jews are genocidal,” and express the wish that the man should die. When the victim calmly attempts to explain why such statements are antisemitic, the situation escalates further. The two women threaten him with physical violence, including beating him up.

July 3: The Jewish Museum Vienna receives an antisemitic death threat by email. The relevant authorities are informed.



Von: [redacted] <[redacted]@aon.at>
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 3. Juli 2025 17:23
An: info@jmw.at
Betreff: juden gesindel

ich werde kommen euch scheis juden gesindel ermorden

Heil HITLER **Ala Ahwa Dschihad**

August 9: Two evidently intoxicated men are in the vicinity of a synagogue. They behave aggressively and shout antisemitic slogans at people recognisable as Jewish. Among other things they scream “Fuck the Jews” and “Jews belong back in Auschwitz,” as well as further statements of similar content in Polish. The police are notified immediately. A report is filed.

September 15: A Jewish woman – not recognisable as such – orders a vehicle from the ride-hailing service Bolt. The driver contacts her by phone before the journey begins, thereby disclosing his number to her. Shortly after the ride starts, the driver stops to allow a man recognisable as Jewish, accompanied by a small child, to cross the street. In this context, he remarks that he had nearly run the man over, but that this would be “irrelevant” since it was a Jew, adding that it would then be “one fewer.” Since the passenger does not react, the driver further explains that he hates Jews

and would most like to run over and kill them all, regardless of whether they are adults or children. The woman attempts to defuse the situation by saying: “Live and let live.” The driver thereupon asks whether she means the situation in Gaza by that, and wants to know whether she is Jewish. She immediately denies it, claiming Russian origin. The driver declares that if she were Jewish she would have to get out at once. Out of fear, she promptly leaves the vehicle. As he drives away, the driver shouts after her: “Shitty Jews, I’ll kill you all.” The woman files a report with the police; the police react immediately and take steps against the driver.

4. 3. Damage and Desecration

The category of damage and desecration covers non-life-threatening assaults on an object. It also includes graffiti and the application of stickers and posters.

February 27: A motorway bridge near Wiener Neudorf (Lower Austria) is daubed with the words “Juden Jagen” (“Hunt Jews”). The Reporting Centre contacts the relevant authorities; the graffiti is removed a short time later.

September 13: Several antisemitic stickers are reported in Graz. Among them two that depict an Israeli flag on which a Star of David is equated with a swastika. A citizen removes the stickers himself and subsequently sends them to the Reporting Centre, which in turn informs the Directorate of State Protection and Intelligence (DSN).



December 15: At the Jewish section of the Zentral-friedhof (Central Cemetery) in Vienna, a traffic sign is defaced with a swastika and the word “Juden” (“Jews”). The Reporting Centre contacts the relevant authorities as well as the City of Vienna’s rapid-response unit – the sign is replaced the very next day.



4. 4. Abusive Behaviour

The category “Abusive behaviour” covers antisemitic abuse, expressions, comments and messages; these may be expressed verbally (face-to-face, by phone) or in writing (letter, email, online media, other digital communication channels) and are directed at a specific person or institution.

March 22: At a demonstration in the framework of the so-called “Israeli Apartheid Week 2025,” organised by the antisemitic BDS movement (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions against Israel), a sign is shown that relativises the Shoah. It equates Theodor Herzl with Adolf Hitler and presents the founding of the Jewish state as the equivalent of the Shoah.



April 19: An Israeli family travels to Vienna by airport taxi. After problems with the card payment, the passengers are disparagingly described as “Jews who always cause problems.”

April 26: At an [anti-Israel demonstration](#) in front of the Hrdlicka Memorial against war and fascism in Vienna, a speaker declares, among other things, that “Zionists and the Israeli regime” should “no longer be regarded as human beings,” but merely as “animals.” At the end of the same demonstration, participants chant – alongside calls for intifada – the Arabic version of the slogan “From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be Free,” which in the original reads: “from the water to the water [from the Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea], Palestine will be Arab.”

May 7: Email to IKG
President Deutsch

Von: [REDACTED]
Gesendet: Mittwoch, 7. Mai 2025 09:35
An: Office (IKG) <office@ikg-wien.at>
Betreff: ***EXTERN*** Zu Händen an oskar Deutsch

So Ihr Juden,

Jetzt nimmt einmal ein österreichischer ehemaliger Bundeskanzler zu Eurer Politik im Gasastreifen Stellung

<https://www.oe24.at/oesterreich/politik/heinz-fischer-was-sich-vor-unseren-augen-abspielt-geht-nicht/632489225>

Ihr braucht Euch nicht wundern das ihr in der Welt immer weniger akzeptiert werdet.
Auch die FPÖ ständig anpatzn das könnt Ihr Juden gut, aber auf hilflose Menschen schiessen und töten da seit ihr die besten.
Eine unglaubliche Frechheit..

May 8: Emails to IKG
Secretary General
Nägele

-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: [REDACTED]
Gesendet: Donnerstag, 8. Mai 2025 07:28
An: Office (IKG) <office@ikg-wien.at>
Betreff: ***EXTERN*** Benjamin Nägele

Sg. Damen und Herren

Es hat vor nicht lange Zeit geheißen, dass die Politik Israels vom IKG nicht kommentiert wird, weil der IKG nur für die Interessen der Juden in Österreich da ist. Das war damals bereits eine glatte Lüge und ein Heucheln wie es im Buche steht, aber das kennt man seit Jahrhunderten.

Der Angriff der Hamas auf die jüdische Bevölkerung wird zum Anlass genommen, die Menschen aus Palästina, dessen Land die Juden sich in bester Kolonialstil angeeignet haben und seit dem Zug um Zug weiter angeeignet haben, vollkommen zu vernichten, auszurotten und dem Erdboden gleich zu machen.

Wir kennen diese Bilder aus dem IIWW. Als Niederländer, wir kommen aus Rotterdam, können wir davon ein Lied singen. Was dies Juden in Israel durch tatkräftige Unterstützung der Juden im Ausland, also auch Österreich da aufführen ist Völkermord, ein Genozid und sind Verbrechen gegen die Menschheit.


Das hat nichts mehr mit der Suche und dem Abstrafen der Täter der Hamas zutun. Die Wahren Verbrecher sitzen in Tel Aviv und in den Hauptstädten im Westen. Es ist wohl der Dummheit und der Prägung Hrn. Nägele geschuldet, wenn er sich so massiv gegen die Kritik stellt. Man kann erkennen, dass Juden immer eine Rechtfertigung gefunden haben, schwerste Verbrechen zu begehen und sofort zur nächsten Tat zu schreiten. Wie bereits berichtet, denke ich, es ist wie die Geschichte dies immer und immer wieder gezeigt hat, eine Frage der Zeit, bis die Juden wieder rennen werden und die Welt nicht mehr verstehen.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen
[REDACTED]

June 6: In front of the Parliament in Vienna, a demonstrator who was also a candidate of the “[Liste Gaza](#)” symbolically tramples on an Israeli flag and invites children to do the same. Applause follows. Meanwhile a speaker criticises former Federal President Heinz Fischer for not having criticised Israel sharply enough and declares, without any connection to the context, that “these Jews, these people, who stole my land, from Poland, from Romania, from England, from France, from Austria,” are not Semites and that antisemitism has a “long nose” – several classic antisemitic stereotypes.

June 24: A driver working for the ride-hailing service Uber speaks to a passenger, whom he does not recognise as Jewish, about the situation in Gaza, shows him YouTube videos and explains that the Jews are to blame for all wars and that they must be “exterminated.”

July 31: Email to the IKG, with an attached Auschwitz-Gaza comparison:



*****EXTERN*** Schämt ihr euch nicht?**


Ich habe mir die letzten Monate sehr viele Gedanken gemacht, ich wollte es nicht wahrhaben dass da im östlichen Mittelmeer täglich hunderte Menschen von Israelis oder in deren Auftrag erschossen werden, verhungern oder verdursten. Aber wenn in Washington zwei jüdische Mitbürger erschossen werden da schreit das Judentum weltweit auf was für eine hinterhältige Tat (was es auch ist). Aber beim täglichen hundertfachen Morden in Gaza da hört man nichts von euch Feiglingen. Wenn ich die Bilder des heutigen Gaza und deren Bevölkerung ansehe sehe ich die Bilder des Warschauer Ghettos welches von den Nazis errichtet wurde. Seid ihr vielleicht um nichts besser wie die Nazis damals?

Und dann kommt der Dienstagabend mit der ZIB2. Gast bei Armin Wolf ist der Präsident der Jüdischen Kultusgemeinde Österreichs, Herr Oskar Deutsch. Dieser Mensch(?) stellt die offensichtlichen Gräueltaten der Juden in Abrede?! Er stellt die Juden als Opfer dar, schon seit Jahrhunderten sind immer die Juden die Schuldigen und dann die armen Opfer. Wenn es nicht so unsagbar traurig wäre müsste man lauthals lachen. Jaja, ihr seid die Opfer, die Bilder der hungernden Bevölkerung in Gaza sind Fake, die Bombeneinschläge der Israelis sind auch Fake, das Elend vor Ort ist Fake, Ich frage mich wo im Nahen Osten die Israelis noch nicht bombardiert und gemordet haben. Beirut bombardieren, Syrien bombardieren, Gaza bombardieren, Iran bombardieren, Die Israelis verhalten sich wie damals die Nazis. Diese sagten auch dass dieses Gebiet, jenes Land, dieser Staat zu Deutschland gehöre. Und wenn sie es nicht freiwillig bekommen haben haben sie es sich kriegerisch geholt. Wie Israel seit über 70 Jahren. Wenn sie ein Stück Land wollen dann wird die arabische Bevölkerung als Terroristen beschuldigt und dann das Land besetzt und ist dann Israelisch.

Das Judentum hat es durch ihr schmutziges und menschenverachtendes Verhalten wirklich geschafft aus mir einen Antisemiten zu machen. Sicher keinen Antisemiten welcher Gewalt anwendet, das machen die Juden selbst mehr als genug, aber jemanden der die Juden sicher nie mehr verteidigen wird. Und so denke nicht nur ich sondern mittlerweile sehr viele Freunde und Menschen aus meinem Bekanntenkreis. Es ist traurig was ihr für armselige und charakterlose „Menschen“ seid, schämt euch!


August 5: A man is leaving the grounds of the Graz Synagogue in his car when a young pedestrian comes towards him. The latter stares at the driver, raises his right arm in a Hitler salute and shouts loudly: “Free Free Palestine! Free Free Palestine!” The driver does not react to the provocation and drives on. After consulting the Reporting Centre, he files a report with the police.

August 5: Under an Instagram post by “Zeit im Bild” with a photo of an emaciated Israeli hostage in Hamas captivity, users post comments covering all manifestations of antisemitism.



August 10: At around 10:30 pm, a woman walks up and down a street inhabited by many Jews in the 2nd District. In doing so she screams “Fuck the Jews, fuck all of them!” and “I hate the Jews!” She then follows an elderly man to his building and briefly prevents him from entering, while continuing to shout the above and similar slogans about “Jews.”

September 15: Antisemitic email to IKG Salzburg



September 12: In Mönichkirchen (Lower Austria), an incident occurs in the course of the debate, ongoing for years, surrounding a memorial stele for three victims of the Nazi regime. The initiator of the memorial project, Peter Halpern, reports that Mayor Andreas Graf confronted him aggressively at the municipal office’s open day, telling him not to “pester” him with a journalist from the newspaper DerStandard, whom he described as “your friend, the Jew.” Asked how he knew that the journalist was Jewish, Graf is said to have answered that one could hear it on the phone. In an [inter-view](#), the mayor partly disputes this account and claims that he was not referring to the journalist but to an anonymous caller, about whom he states: “That was a Jew, I know that dialect.”


October 2: Under an article on “unzensuriert.at” about the deadly attack on a synagogue in Manchester, antisemitic and in part racist comments are posted. One comment states, for example, that it “shouldn’t matter” when “the skullcap wearers get hit”; beneath it, the attack is denied by means of conspiracy myths, there is talk of the “Satanist star” (instead of the Star of David), and Judaism and Islam are described as “child-abuser sects.”



4. 5. Mass Mailings

This refers to written antisemitic material sent to at least two addressees and usually targeting a large group of recipients. It includes publications (online and offline, e.g. newspapers, magazines, blogs), documents sent to multiple recipients (letters, emails) and the social media platforms which are rapidly replacing the latter two.

February 10: The so-called “Palästinasolidarität Tirol” (Palestine Solidarity Tyrol) posts an Instagram story in which the Warsaw Ghetto is compared with the Palestinian-administered city of Jenin in the West Bank.




May 10: On the Instagram account of a teacher in Vienna, who was also a candidate of the so-called “Liste Gaza,” a mural apparently painted in Rome and titled “The Final Solution,” showing a kiss between Hitler and Netanyahu, is shared. The teacher adds “Zionism is nazism.”





August: A cyclist recognisable as Jewish on account of his appearance is photographed by a passer-by. The latter [publishes the image on TikTok](#) with an antisemitic framing. A flood of antisemitic comments follows, many of which violate applicable law. Many contain the relevant memes and statements such as “money Jew,” “Jew nose” and “I hunt them.” Both the post and the comments remain unremoved for days.

October 26: An anti-Israel activist posts on the Austrian National Day on Instagram: “Happy National Day you fucking Zio-Nazis.”



October 30: At a bus stop in Salzburg, sheets of paper with antisemitic content are regularly placed, which are eventually forwarded to the Reporting Centre. The NS Reporting Office of the DSN is contacted; the Salzburg Provincial Office for State Protection and Counter-Extremism takes up the investigation shortly afterwards.




5. Manifestations of Antisemitism

The Reporting Centre categorises incidents according to five manifestation types. With the beginning of the 2025 reporting period, the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism included the manifestation “Anti-Judaistic Antisemitism” and has thereby taken a further step towards comparability of data on antisemitic incidents with other countries. Referring to publications of its German partner organisation RIAS, the Reporting Centre for Antisemitism defines this manifestation as follows:

Anti-Judaism denotes the religiously shaped form of hatred of Jews. Its core lies in the attribution of collective guilt: Jews are portrayed as “God-killers” and are demonised over centuries in ritual-murder, blood and host-desecration legends as enemies of Christendom. These narratives outlasted even fundamental theological reassessments in the 20th century, as a cultural sediment. Today they emerge in new guises: old accusations are translated into political contexts and updated. Since the massacres by Palestinian terrorist organisations on October 7, 2023 at the latest, and the war that has continued since, it has become apparent how classic anti-Judaistic motifs are projected onto Israel and linked with handed-down religious enemy images. These are regularly transported in traditional media as well.

The diagram shows the number of incidents by manifestation. It should be noted here that an incident can display several manifestation types.

Manifestations of Antisemitism




Israel-related antisemitism, at 77.4%, continues to represent by far the most significant manifestation of antisemitic incidents; in proportional terms, the strongest increases compared with 2024 are in the cases of antisemitic othering (from 32% to 49%) and those of Shoah relativisation/denial (from 28.7% to 40.8%). These are also the manifestations most frequently transported in combination with Israel-related antisemitism.

Shoah relativisation and denial thus reached in 2025 its highest share of incidents since the Covid pandemic (2021: 33.6%, 2022: 17.9%, 2023: 16.8%, 2024: 28.7%). The explicit denial of the historical facts of the Shoah is increasingly receding into the background. In its place has come systematic relativisation, which has consolidated itself as a robust ideologeme right across all antisemitic milieus. A look at the distribution by ideological background underlines this finding: 28% of the cases of Shoah relativisation/denial had a left-wing ideological background, closely followed by a right-wing (25%) and a Muslim background (24%). In 23% of cases no attribution was possible.


Particularly glaring here is the strong convergence with Israel-related antisemitism: in total, 79.8% of all cases of Shoah distortion overlap with the latter. That is no coincidence. When Israel's actions in Gaza are systematically and in campaign form equated with the Shoah, when the [Star of David and the swastika](#) are montaged into one and the same image, or when a direct reference to the Shoah is made in connection with an accusation of genocide, then the memory of it is not distorted incidentally, but deliberately deployed as a weapon against the Jewish state. The message is twofold: it relativises the Shoah and at the same time delegitimises Israel by forcing it into the role of the perpetrator of that time. That these two manifestations overlap in almost four out of five cases shows a consolidated strategy in which remembrance is not questioned but instrumentalised – with Israel as the central projection surface.

Overlaps between Israel-related antisemitism and Holocaust relativization/denial




With antisemitic othering the situation is similar, if not quite as glaring: 68% of all cases occur in combination with Israel-related antisemitism. This shows itself particularly often in the demand that Jews “go to Israel” if they do not like it in Austria – a formulation that denies them their belonging to Austria and at the same time equates them with the State of Israel. Equally widespread is the mechanism of holding Jews collectively to account on the basis of Israeli policy and deriving from this their exclusion from Austrian society.


Overlaps between Israel-related antisemitism and antisemitic othering




2025: 267 cases of Anti-Judaism




2025: 625 cases of Shoah relativisation/denial




2025: 750 cases of Antisemitic Othering



2025: 254 cases of Antisemitic conspiracy theories



2025: 1.186 cases of Israel-Related Antisemitism




5. 1. Calls for and Glorification of Terrorism


In the framework of recording antisemitic incidents, the Reporting Centre now additionally indicates whether these contain a call for terrorism or violence, or glorify them. Such cases may be criminally relevant (e.g. under §282a StGB). In 2025 this was identified 184 times, corresponding to 12 percent of all registered incidents.

6. Ideological Background

Antisemitic incidents - Ideological background



Antisemitic incidents 2024




“Right-wing” covers all the incidents which could be attributed to the political or sociopolitical right-wing, right-wing extremism or (neo-)Nazism.

“Left-wing” covers all the incidents which could be attributed to the political or sociopolitical left-wing or left-wing extremism in all its forms (e.g. the antisemitic BDS movement and anti-imperialism).


“Muslim” refers to antisemitic incidents perpetrated by people or organisations which can be attributed to Islam on account of their world view or religious beliefs, including Islamism.

19 Assaults




As in 2024, in 2025 too just over half of the assaults were perpetrated by Muslims. In four cases the ideological background could not be established; two assaults each came from the right and from the left.

205 Damage and desecration




In the case of targeted property damage, right-wing and unattributable incidents are roughly in balance, while damage with a left-wing background rose sharply from the first half of the year. Property damage with a Muslim background was comparatively rarely established. Slightly more than a quarter of the cases were ideologically unattributable.

Abusive behaviour (626 incidents)




Cases of abusive behaviour were for the most part not clearly attributable. 27 percent had a Muslim background, 22 percent a right-wing one. Just under 14% could be attributed to a left-wing ideological background.

27 Threats




Just under half of the threats were made by people with a Muslim background. Four threats each had a right-wing and a left-wing background, while in seven cases no ideological background could be established.

439 Mass mailings



Exactly half of the cases of mass mailings were written by a politically left-motivated person. 26 percent had a Muslim background, while 16 percent were classified as ideologically right-wing. Fewer than ten percent were unattributable.

Yearly trend by ideological background 2024 (left) and 2025 (right)



7. Methodology

The cornerstone of our working methodology is the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism.

7.1. Working Definition of Antisemitism

Since the [working definition of antisemitism](#) created in 2005 by the EUMC with the help of numerous experts and affected individuals was adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in May 2016, it has gained steadily increasing international support at many different levels. 26 EU member states officially use this definition – only Malta is still pending. The country has held observer status in the IHRA only since June 2024. Austria adopted the antisemitism definition in 2017 (by the Council of Ministers) and 2018 (by the municipal councils in Vienna and Graz), followed by further federal states and municipalities. The significance and important role of the working definition in combating antisemitism is also emphasised in the Vienna Declaration, signed in 2022 by currently 15 European states, which among many other things states:

“We agree to further promote the use of the IHRA non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism, which can serve as a basis to collect comparable data on antisemitic incidents including data that is below the criminal threshold.”

The working definition is also a core component of the [National Strategy Against Antisemitism 2.0](#) presented in November 2025.

Although not legally binding, this definition is the scientifically recognised foundation for the fight against antisemitism. It also enables international comparability, which is essential for drawing insights and developing targeted, related measures. At the national level, it also serves research, the work against antisemitism, and law enforcement, which is often the first point of contact for those affected by antisemitism.

It should again be emphasised that not every antisemitic incident has legal implications; however, the best possible documentation is necessary to gain a comprehensive picture, in order to be able to recognise, analyse, and combat antisemitism.

All incidents reported to us are compared against this definition; not all of them meet its criteria and some are therefore not included in the statistics.

Here is the definition in full:

“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”

The “IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism” includes the following concretising examples:

Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic.

Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

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